We find the requirements on change of evolutionary stability of a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) when a game changes its form from classical to quantum or conversely. We consider a quantized two players two strategies symmetric game. We find that an entangled state in a more general form is needed to affect evolutionary stability of a mixed NE than needed, with similar purpose, for a pure NE.
Introduction
In a recent paper [3] we showed that evolutionary stability of a pure strategy in a two player symmetric quantum game can be changed by maneuvering an entangled initial state in its simpler form. For pure classical strategies 1 and 2 the simpler form of the the entangled state is written as |ψ ini = |11 + |22 . This is the form of entangled state that Marinatto and Weber [1] used in their scheme to play the quantum version of Battle of Sexes. We also showed that with this simpler form of an entangled state evolutionary stability of a mixed NE in a symmetric bimatrix quantum game cannot be changed by a maneuver of entangled state when the corresponding NE remain intact [3] . However, it can be done when the number of players are increased from two to three [4] .
Support of an ESS [6] is a commonly used term in classical evolutionary game theory. When a mixed strategy p is an ESS its support is a set of pure strategies than can be played by a p player. A mixed ESS means an ESS whose support contains both the pure strategies. Mixed strategies in classical evolutionary game theory are important for two reasons: 1: It is well known that for two player no two ESSs can have the same support. Therefore, when a mixed ESS is existing no other mixed ESS can be there. However, there can exist other ESSs with support containing a pure strategy only. 2: Mixed ESSs are different from the point of view of continuous stability and Continuously Stable Strategies (CSSs) in two player symmetric games are found to be of mixed type. The notion of a CSS is a further refinement of ESS [7] .
In this paper we are interested in the evolutionary stability of a mixed NE in symmetric quantum games between two players when players have access to only two pure strategies. We already considered evolutionary stability of a mixed strategy in analysis of quantum version of the Rock-Scissor-Paper (RSP) game [5] . In RSP game support of the mixed strategy contains three strategies. However, in present analysis the support contains only two pure strategies. The game is symmetric and played between two players in both cases.
Evolutionary stability of a mixed NE
In classical symmetric bi-matrix game played in evolutionary set up all the members of population are indistinguishable and each individual is equally likely to face each other individual. Suppose the finite number of pure strategies available to each player are labelled 1, ..., n. Let write the set of pure strategies as {1, ..., n}. In case player 1 plays i against player 2 playing j then player 1 receives reward a ij and player 2 receives a ji . The value a ij is an element in the n × n payoff matrix M. Instead of a pure strategy a player has an option to play a mixed strategy. It means he plays i with probability p i for each i = 1, ..., n. A probability vector p then represents the mixed strategy played by a player. Average or expected payoff to player 1 playing p against player 2 playing q is written as P (p, q) [6] :
where p T is transpose of p. In fact payoff to a player in quantized version of RSP game [5] can also be written in similar form provided the matrix M is replaced with a matrix corresponding to quantum version of this game. Each player has access to three pure strategies represented by 1, 2, and 3 and the game is given by the following matrix:
The quantized version of the game is, then, [5] played by applying unitary operators I, C and D defined as follows on an entangled state [1] [5].
and I is identity operator. Suppose player 1 apply C D and I with probabilities p, p 1 and (1 − p − p 1 ) and player 2 apply C D and I with probabilities q, q 1 and (1 − q − q 1 ) respectively on an initial entangled state in the following general form:
with the matrix ω given as:
and the terms of the matrix ω are: 
In this notation quantum version of a symmetric game between two players with three pure strategies has a form similar to a classical matrix game; with the payoff matrix replaced with its quantum version given in (6) that now involves coefficients c ij of the entangled initial state (3). The matrix (6) can be reduced to its classical form given in (2) by making the initial state unentangled i.e. 
It is now a two player two strategy game with the general initial state (3) used in the game. The available pure strategies are now 1 and 3 only and the terms with subscripts containing 2 disappear. Take x = 1 − p and y = 1 − q i.e. xα 33 − α 13 α 11 − α 31 − α 13 + α 33 = ω 33 − ω 13 ω 11 − ω 31 − ω 13 + ω 33 (13) also from (9):
From eqs. (13) and (14) we get α 33 − α 13 = α 11 − α 31 and then
. Therefore, the mixed strategy x ⋆ = 1 2 can be a NE in both classical and a quantum form of the game. This mixed NE, not an ESS classically, can become an ESS when (ω 11 − ω 31 − ω 13 + ω 33 ) < 0. Given (α 11 − α 13 − α 31 + α 33 ) > 0 and eq. (14) 
So that if the game is played using an initial state of the form
it is not possible that the mixed strategy x ⋆ = 1 2 is an ESS in only one form of the game, i.e. classical or quantum, when it is NE in both.
Conclusion
In a symmetric bi-matrix classical game a mixed NE is distinguished by the fact that its support contains both pure strategies. We studied evolutionary stability of a mixed NE in a quantized form of symmetric bi-matrix game. We selected a mixed NE that survives a switch-over between two forms of the symmetric game; one classical and the other quantum. We examined evolutionary stability of this NE with the requirement that it is an ESS in only one form of the game. We found that an entangled state, corresponding to quantum form of the game, in its more general form is needed to meet this requirement than in the case of similar change in evolutionary stability of pure strategies.
